BRADY.LET (Converted)
Governor's Plaza
560 East South Temple, C-103
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
December 23, 1991
The Honorable Nicholas Brady
Secretary of the Treasury
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Secretary Brady:
This is a seriously intended letter. During my career in the State Department, I
was Senior Economist in the Office of International Monetary Affairs and worked closely
with Treasury officials. I subsequently served as Economic Advisor to our OECD Mission in Paris, was Acting Director of the Office of European Regional Political/Economic
Affairs, and Director of the Office of Economic Intelligence and Research. And I've
replied to hundreds of citizens who've written the Secretary of State with their
ideas for solving the world's problems. So I realize this will be delegated to one of
your staff people. I also recognize that my comments are basically of a political
dimension which few of your professional staff will be equipped to deal with or appropriately evaluate. I can thus only hope this letter will be bucked up to someone on your
staff of political appointees, so the ideas will at least lodge in his/her brain
and be put forward somewhere along the line in a policy paper which will find its
way to your desk.
Indeed, I put forward the idea on German debt repayment a few years ago to your predecessor
James Baker when he was Secretary of the Treasury. And had the ironic experience
of later meeting at an OECD do in Paris the chap who'd drafted the reply to my letter. He was then a member of the US Mission and I was working as an OECD Consultant
and we had a good chuckle about the principles of framing apparently responsive and
always inoffensive replies to constituent letters while saying nothing of substance.
I truly hope something more may come of this letter, given the startling changes in
circumstances which have occurred in the meantime.
My suggestion is that we unilaterally declare an end to the post WW-I debt moratorium
with the Germans which both your Treasury people and my former State Department office
colleagues still dutifully calculate and report to Congress year by year. The Germans are now running enormous surpluses in their balance of payments, and we are running
enormous deficits. While it is generous on our part to let the Germans use their
surpluses to rehabilitate their Ossie relatives and comfort their former Soviet enemies, I (and I'll bet millions of other Americans) have a hard time understanding why
our rich German cousins can't begin to pay back their debt to us first, which with
accumulated interest would slow down their economic advance a little (and that of
the competitive EC monster that my former Harvard professor Gottfried Haberler warned us years
ago the Community would inevitably become, but which none of us starry eyed Trans-Atlanticists
would believe). This would give us the resources to take care of some of the pressing domestic social and infrastructure problems which we're having to finance
by borrowing (from, guess who, the Japs and Germans).
If we then want to turn around and use this money to rehabilitate the Russians, fine.
This would be our decision. But as I see it, the FRG is using what should be our
money -- prior debts have logical seniority -- to gain moral and trade benefits with
the Russians which should accrue to the US. When I put this proposal forward a half
dozen years ago to Mr. Baker, his clever surrogate pen wrote back that "it would
be impossible at this late date to allocate the proportion of the debt to be repaid
by the East and West Germans governments". Obviously, this is no longer an issue. It's again
one Germany with one government, one system of taxation, and one huge international
debt which has been awaiting repayment for almost as long as the erstwhile communist
governments of Eastern Europe have been wasting the resources of almost half the world.
We're finally getting a bit firmer with the Japanese about opening up their monopsonistic
economic system. Though each time we press a Prime Minister to agree to changes,
Japan changes Prime Ministers and it seems we have to start all over again with the
next one. So our delay in coming to grips with the Japs is more understandable.
America has been used to dealing with monopoly and with governments where the promises
of one administration are honored by the next. So it's taken us awhile to come to
an understanding about the workings of monopsony, with which we're historically unfamiliar, and with convenient changes of government when foreign leadership can no longer
stand up to our reasonable pressure.
I enclose a paper on The Theory of Second Best and US Trade Policy
, drawn from my Harvard PhD dissertation written thirty years ago, which received
plaudits from my examining committee. Indeed, the entire dissertation was subsequently
published by Universities Press, with copies ordered by every OECD delegation in
multiple copies for Mission and Home Office reading, though it seems to have fallen into
oblivion in the United States, much as Professor Denison's notions about quality
control were adopted abroad while being ignored in their country of origin.
I've mailed reprints to Congressman Rostenkowski, the Chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee, White House Counselor for Domestic Affairs Steven Studdert, and a dozen
other selected committee members. When I sent it to the Economist
magazine, it was denounced in an editorial, without being explicitly identified,
as an example of the rising protectionist sentiment in the United States. But I
think the thinking it expresses is finally finding an echo in some democrat candidates.
I would hope that the Republican-run Treasury and White House might read it carefully
before dismissing it as "know nothing" trash. Richard Caves and Gottfried Haberler,
who are certainly not "know nothings", considered it my contribution to the advancement of economic thinking and worthy of a Harvard PhD. And I've defended the concept,
and persuaded not a few of my academic colleagues at George Washington, the U of
Maryland, the University of Paris, and universities in Mexico and Central America
where I've taught, that this is the explanation and answer to what we've been experiencing
from Japan's manipulation of false Free Trade verities to our disadvantage.
I'll be looking forward to what your proxy-pens have to say about a) my suggestion
that we get the Germans, upon whose goodwill as an advance base towards the Warsaw
Pact we are no longer dependent, and who've benefitted from sixty years of US patience
and benevolence, to start repaying WW-I reparations plus accumulated interest on whatever
terms can be negotiated; and b) my notion that the US and the world would actually
be better off by our introducing a series of carefully calculated departures from
the non-existent theoretical Free Trade norm (along the lines of the DISC and IET legislation
of the '60s), to achieve a Second Best sub-optimum well above the third best situation
we're currently experiencing.
This isn't protectionism, it's common sense (and post post-Keysian economic sense)
for economic survival in a world of increasing preferential trading blocs, predatory
international pricing, and monopsonistic national purchasing/distribution cartels.
Sincerely,
D. B. Timmins
Professor of Finance & Economics
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