HOBBES AND LOCKE: THE ANTIPODAL CONFLICT BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND PERSONAL LIBERTY
David B. Timmins, PhD
There is scarce any of those old Writers, that contradicted not sometimes both himself and others; which makes their testimonies insufficieni. 1/
At a time when vast numbers of the world's population recently emerged from colonial rule are attempting to gauge the relative equities of liberty and authority--the merits of stability against the risks of autocracy--it may be useful to compare the thoughts of two of the most influential thinkers who have ever written upon these issues: Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Such a re-evaluation may also be apt following recent political developments in the United States in which i t appeared to many that the direction of American political evolution was at stake to a degree rarely paralleled in our history. Ideas traceable to the writings of Hobbes and Locke served to polarize opinion during our own revolutionary era and profoundly affected the institutions of government which are today being so assiduously reassessed by conservatives, liberals, and radicals around the world.
Moreover, the essential elements to which both Hobbes and Locke address themselves--the timeless questions concerning the nature of man, society, property, and the state--remain highly relevant despite the time which has elapsed since their thoughts were composed and regardless of the degree to which later writers have embellished their substance.
Both writers, living in an era as revolutionary as our own, were essentially concerned with the fundamental rights which have come to be associated with Western Civilization. While each initiated his analysis of society with what is essentially a similar analysis of man in nature, the two thinkers draw apart from each other as they proceed towards radically differing evaluations of the elements each considers of prime importance in civil society and the ideal allocation of responsibility for ensuring the continuation of these factors. Indeed, the philosophical systems created by Hobbes and Locke are commonly accepted as the touchstones of opposing concepts of government. Yet, as shall be seen, having departed from substantially the same position, and despite having journeyed in opposite directions during a large part of their philosophic wanderings, their subconsciously shared community of values seems inexorably, if paradoxically, to impel each to return towards the basically pragmatic and generously humanistic AngloSaxon precepts they shared by virtue of their common heritage.
Hobbes perceived with a depth of original insight seldom equalled in the social sciences that man qua human being has no "rights" worthy of the designation (beyond mere self-preservation) outside an ordered and stable civil framework. Neat and mathematically oriented as his mind was, Hobbes gave the ordering of society a natural precedence in his analysis and all is subordinated to this primary requirement. Locke, lawyers son and religious dissenter, advanced with equal vigor the notion that order without a minimal freedom of inquiry and expression, a reasonably sure title to the fruits of labor, and the assurance of some influence on the direction of events in the society of which one is part, is but another term for slavery. Indeed, though the two men were not quite contemporaries, it is clear from their writings that they recognized themselves to be writing to contradict the general point of view oustained by the other.
While their lives differed radically in particulars, both men were yet subject in the broader sense to the same era of revolutionary change and hence to much of the same formative environment, which one might take as accounting for the ambivalence and paradoxes with which each of their writings abound. For it is when they appear furthest apart that, almost without fail, one or the other advances some far-reaching qualification to a previous dogmatic statement which serves to reduce the difference to one of emphasis. Inevitably this brings both men to much the same position when considering a concrete situation--though their discussions have commenced from logical antipodes. Religion was the one area in which no such reconciliation was made. The depth of feeling existing at that time did not yet permit rational compromise. Hobbes remained intractably absolutist with regard to religion, while Locke was far more tolerant than his times.
MAN AND THE STATE OF NATURE
Unlike Hobbes who conceived men in the State of Nature to be "few, fierce, short-lived, oor, nasty, and deprived of all pleasure, and beauty of life," Locke saw the State of Nature as a period of reason, freedom, and equality. To Locke, an individual in violation of the laws of nature is punishable by anyone aware of his evil-doing; but only to the extent which reason and conscience dictate is proportionate to the transgression. In point of fact, however, Locke considers the law of nature to be found only in the minds of men, and thus subject to misapplication or distortion as a result of passion or interest. And since individuals cannot be counted on to apply these laws justly, such inconveniences exist in the state of nature as to render this condition sufficiently undesirable to induce men to look for some method by which to avoid the constant threat of wrongful acts. It is already evident that Locke, having advanced these qualifications to his initially beatific view of the State of Nature, is drawing nearer to the Hobbesian position.
Even so, it is necessary to acknowledge that Hobbes would unquestionably have faulted Lockels position both on points of emphasis and with regard to his analysis of basic motivations. Hobbes would without doubt concede that much of what Locke says is not without weight; but would assert that these are, after all, peripheral or marginal motivations for man's dissatisfaction with the state of nature. For while men may be distressed by Ilinconveniences" and "injustices" in the state of nature, man is really a more vicious animal than Locke is disposed to admit. And the true source of man's anxiety--at its irreducible minimum--is self -preservati on, particularly from violent death. Beyond this, Hobbes would argue that the three basic human attributes discussed in Chapter XIII of Leviathan, viz., (1) Competition, (2) Diffidence, and (3) Love of Glory, which are the natural sources of human quarreling, would render the state of nature immeasurably more hostile than Locke concedes. All the motive necessary for urging men to seek a way out of the state of war is found in the ground of self -preservation alone, and one need not clutter the outline further with overmuch detail.
MAN AND PROPERTY
But for purposes of the present analysis, matters are not so simply disposed of: Locke's interest in the preservation of "property"--many times reiterated--as the chief lever advancing the transition of civil society is not to be dismissed simply as a pamphleteerls response to a political controversy of the time. The argument is far subtler than this, Locke insisting that property and self are at root indistinguishable. That is, he maintains that the source of property lies in the proprietorship of onels own physical being and the labor it is capable of performing. The more elaborate forms property takes proceed directly from the convention of money as a means of exchange and store of value. Thus, in Lockeian semantics, property could be held to have existed prior to the institution of civil society since a man's efforts, even in the state of nature, were inextricably mingled with his own life and freedom from physical constraint. "Property" in this sense presupposes the physical integrity of the individual; and the Lockeian concept of property is thus residually based on self-preservation--which is also the ultimate concern for Hobbes.
Lest it be thought that this reconciliation of Locke and Hobbes is too fragile to bear close examination, it should be observed that Hobbes himself leans much further in the direction of the protection of property as a motivation for the establishment of civil society than is generally conceded.3/ He stipulates, in fact, that "the Office of the Sovereign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assemblyj consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Sovereign Power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people.4 / He then proceeds to define "safety of the people" as broadly as Locke had defined "property" so that it includes "not a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life, which every man by lawful industry, without danger or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to himself." In short, while society was created to obtain peace and to reduce the likelihood of violent death, there are comprehended in the preservation of life certain higher purposes, including property, defined as the contentments of life. 5 / Thus should Hobbes, in some imaginary debate between the two, have been in a position to charge Locke with absurdity in conceiving of property preceding the institution of civil society, we may, perhaps, consider this testimony somewhat insufficient, since "there is scarce any of those old writers, that contradicted not sometimes both himself, and others.6 /
THE SOVEREIGN AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Whatever the merits with which one is inclined to greet this attempt to reconcile the views of these two profound minds with respect to their concepts of man, property, and the state of nature, surely, it will be insisted, their differences with respect to the area of control over human life embraced by the sovereign in the civil state remain unbridgeable. Hobbes i s traditionally accepted as the defender of monarchy and the sovereign's total prerogative, while Locke's views on the natural rights of the individual are evidenced in the Declaration of Independence of the United States. And since, to both Hobbes and Locke, man in the state of nature is conceived of as a rational being carefully calculating both the advantages and disadvantages of giving up his natural freedom in favor of civil society, it can hardly be imagined that he would have made this choice without having reached clear conclusions as to the prospective state of his affairs once this contract were negotiated. Such preconceptions of the way society would work, together with some anticipation of precisely which liberties were being surrendered and which retained, would, moreover, have induced a substantial "feed-back" effect on the decision being made. Thus, in undertaking to discuss, if briefly, Locke's attitude regarding the just operation of the "anticipatory civil society"--and to contrast this with Hobbes' position in this regard--we must first reconstruct the thoughts which would presumably activate the minds of the hypothetical men engaged in contemplating the transition to civil society under each of the two theories of civil society under analysis.
To Locke, the transition to civil society is imagined as having come about as men, through the application of their labor, began to engage in tillage and to acquire possessions. At this stage of the transition, life became a more complicated process than merely protecting a store of nuts or evading the inconveniences of misapplied natural law at the hands of onels neighbors blinded by passion or self-interest. As a common store of value and means of exchange came into being, conflicts increased to the point where it became of greater utility for men to unite into one body, having a common established law and judicature with authority to decide controversies and punish offenders, than for each to retain this authority individually. Thus the objective of civil society is essentially to avoid and remedy those inconveniences of the state of nature which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case .... Wherever any persons are who have not such an authority to appeal to ... those persons are still in the state of Nature. And so is every absolute prince, in respect of those under his dominion .... Hence it is evident that absolute monarchy ... is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all. 7 /
This is to say, the basic rights which civil society was instituted to protect, viz., life, liberty (with a minimal surrender of the right of self-judgment, which was necessary to the institution of the common judge), and property, can never be relinquished. To do so would be to exchange the very elements for which society was established for the most miserable form of slavery. Indeed, Locke would find even this formulation inadequate; for these "rights" cannot be yielded permanently even in such compelling conditions, though their substance may for the time being be eclipsed. For the individual has no right to bargain away his own life; and whoever allows his liberty or his means of livelihood to be placed in control of another cannot be held to such a covenant which is contrary to nature ab initio. Libert , property, and life are inextricably dependent on one another. 8/
Again, contrary to commonly held conviction, 9 / Hobbes also recognizes this interrelationship. Characteristically, he does so in one of his frequent qualifications to an otherwise categorical statement. In conceding the right to defend one's life, he further specifies the right to defend one's 'Imeans of preserving life, as not to be weary of it."10 / Yet, what is this typically cryptic phrase to be understood to imply if it does not allude to the retention of a degree of personal liberty and property? Indeed, in another place, Hobbes directly connects "defence of life, and means of living." 11 /
LIFE AND LIBERTY
While agreeing that a man undoubtedly retains an inalienable right to defend his life, Hobbes would assert that to introduce any question concerning the absolute nature of the sovereign would diminish the v.ery safety and security of life which men have contracted together to preserve; for if each man knows that the others have not bargained in good faith, he can never be sure when this residual "natural liberty" held over from the state of nature may be called into play. 12 / At this point, the conflict between Hobbes and Locke appears particularly acute since Locke argues directly that men have the right to anticipate a breach of trust or invasion of liberty or property by the sovereign. 13 / Yet, such anticipation would be viewed by Hobbes as an invitation and encouragement to rebel lion. 14 / To Hobbes a breach on the part of the sovereign is inconceivable, since the sovereign is necessarily no party to the contract at all. In Hobbes' scheme of things, the sovereign must stand outside the contract in order to continue to exercise the right of punishment on behalf of society. Thus the fundamental right to preserve onels life, in Hobbes' way of thinking, can be exercised only through flight or taking up the sword in self-defense; but never through fomenting rebellion. Only whe n Leviathan fails to maintain order and afford protection to society as a whole can the contract of each man with each man be considered broken and men be released to seek new forms of mutual protection against one another. 15 /
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION
But closer analysis once more discloses that Hobbes and Locke are not nearly so far apart as their more categorical arguments might appear to have placed them. For Locke recognizes that the society is justified in defending itself against inroads only at such time and in such conditions as all members of society, or a majority of them, feel their very lives, liberties, and/or property are imperiled. 16 / Can this mean anything else but that Leviathan has failed in his duty to the main part of society and that the preponderance of power no longer supports him? Here then is nothing less than a restatement of Hobbes' own position that "those men that are so remissely governed that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre: and their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another...." 17/ It is here implied quite directly that the transition to civil society from the state of nature may, on occasion, (1) be abortive; i.e., fail to take place despite outward appearances, or (2) be subject to deterioration from a genuine civil state into one of war, in which the sovereign presumably becomes no sovereign by degree. There again exists here a situation tântamount to that propounded by Locke with respect to the possibility of a sovereign "dethroning" himself; and Hobbes and Locke, ostensibly at the poles of opinion once more are found in reasonable proximity confronted with a concrete issue.
Yet to be determined in such circumstances is whether LeviathanIs dwindling strength must be tried on the field of battle, as implied in Hobbes; or whether this test can be institutionalized through some quantitative estimate of majority will (which might then be taken as demonstrating what the preponderance of power would bave been should it have been necessary for armed conflict to have taken place). As one might expect from the previous discussion, Hobbes himself is forced by his own logic and honesty to pay court to the concept of an institutionalized substitute for war, 18 / though having done so, he hastens on to other matters apparently without plumbing the logic of his own words. Hobbes moreover recognizes the logical possibility of "conditional covenant'l and "fiduciary trust, 19 / concepts he seemingly could have discussed as readily in connection with his treatment of forms of limited government as Locke later did--but which he also fails to explore.
Locke, on the contrary, insists that people in the state of nature, contemplating the transition to a civil society, would no more overlook these obvious alternatives to an absolute sovereign than to "take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by polecats or foxes, but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions." 20/ Grappling with the inevitable rise of those intractable ones who seek a superfluity of goods, Locke moreover perceives that it may be the ruler himself who on occasion proves such a malignant personality, and Locke holds such an one doubly guij~y in warring on society since he has held a double trust. 21/ Hobbes, on the other hand, falls somewhat beneath his usual performance on this occasion, doing no better than to recognize the problem while protesting that this is after all but a normal human weakness not specific to the fonn of government. It is, as he sees it, one of the general inconveniences men must endure as the price of civil order. Indeed, the fault, if any, is that of humanity for being so M-behaved that it needs government. Certainly the Sovereign should not be held to blame. (Though elsewhere, speakinq of such men--not the sovereign- -Hobbes straightforwardly asserts they should be left out, or cast out, of society as enemies of the civil state.) 22 / His logic now gets hini into severe difficulties since the sovereign (assuming him for the moment to be such an anti-social individual) is already outside civil society (with his power to make war, to be sure, usefully channeled in normal circunistances to societyls benefit). But it is aiso clear that when the sovereign seeks to invade the ]ives of his subjects in a manner "superfluous" to his own need for power to protect society he becomes literally destructive of the end for which his office was instituted and coriies into violation of both the first and the fifth "fundamental law of nature"--to ail of which society cou7d hard7y be expected to remain impassive despite the deepest appreciation and acceptance of Hobbesian logic.
Hobbes is, on this issue, clearly embroiled by his own dogmatism, while Locke cuts cleanly through the issue. Yet after ail this, and despite his earlier seemingly uncompromising position, Hobbes again demonstrates with great integrity his dedication to the same generous English tradition, prescribing, in effect, the same remedy as Locke for the predicament: man 'lis then in the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is sol' (which, be it noted, concedes Lockels position that control over onels means of living is tantaniount to control over onels being, and 7arge7y grants the case for property and residual rights). 23/ In such circumstances, one is authorized by both authors to use such means to protect oneseif as one can in case of invasion either by private persons or by the sovereign.
As might be expected Hobbes has created new difficulties for himseif in adopting this essentially Lockeian position, since he thereby brings himself into conflict with his own previous statement to the effect that property is nothing more than the sovereign's distribution of the national product. 24 / Having conceded that "life" without the means of keeping oneseif not %eary of itll is little more than a philosophic abstraction, he is certainiy inconsistent in arguing that property is but a simple prerogative of the sovereign, while simuitaneously stipulating that society was formed for the preservation of life and that one can therefore defend onels being even from the sovereign.
THE FORMS OF THE STATE
The dialogue becomes at this point a question of parahistorical interpretation--though it is expecting perhaps too much of the mythical founders of civil society for them to have grasped that the way in which men in the future would view the past would by a form of "mirror effect" influence profoundly the way in which they, the founders, should, in turn, conceive the future. That is to say, if men in the state of nature were to perceive that their having established a limited government, a future misinterpretation of history might make it appear that they had in fact instituted an absolute monarchy, in which the liberties and property rights they had sought to hedge about by the civil contract were delivered without recourse to an absolute sovereign by reason of the logical distortions of a future Hobbes, they might have had second thoughts about the "inconveniences" of the state of nature. At least some presociety Lockeian with the gift of reflexive foresight might be forgiven for so thinking.
Rendering this thought of more moment, Hobbes himself recognizes that some kingdoms exist in which the power of the king is limited; but he insists as to such cases that though these bé called "monarchies" by most writers, such kings are in fact not "sovereign" but mere "ministers of those who have the sovereign power." 25 / Hobbes could thus criticize the argument that England was in fact such a limited monarchy, only on historical grounds not in terms of theory. Locke is less constrained by his position and would not feel himself bound even should he conceivably be forced to concede a period of absolute monarchy in English history. For Lockels theory of government leaves him free to assert that no form of government, be it ever so absolute, can rightfully invade the minimal and inalienable rights of life, liberty and prosperity, and even should a despot wrongfully succeed in wresting away such rights, the people would nevertheless retain the right to "plead their cause before heaven" until they or their descendants ~~în sufficient strength to free themselves from this yoke 26 /. While Hobbes, conceivably, might agree that if the situation under review were truly one of a "ministerialll government" --i.e., one in which the people retained sovereignty and in which the first minister was wrongfully seeking to make inroads on this sovereignty--the sovereign (the people) would have not only the right but the duty to preserve its authority unimpaired. But should this sovereign once lose its power through any means to another, then a new Leviathan would come into being, though perhaps under different form. And if it were in shape of an absolute monarch, Hobbes would admit no nonsense about children inheriting any residual rights or l'appeals to heaven." Those who set in motion agitation for reform (as they see it), Hobbes considers to be not nearly so wise as they think, since few live long enough to see their own designs established and posterity alone who would least have wished it", 27 / see the benefits.
This leads directly to a consideration of the possibility of placing limitations on the sovereign. Lockels sovereign is always limited--at least with respect to the basic rights at the time of transition to civil society. It is here that the difference between Hobbes and Locke is seen to run deeper than anywhere else save with regard to religion. No matter where the legislative power is placed, or what the exterior form the government may take, Locke's ultimate authority is in the last resort the people, who retain a supreme right to alter the legislative authority--be it one man or an assembly--when they find it acting contrary to its trust. Hobbes' sovereignty may be severally placed by the contracting people in accordance with their will. But once placed it remains whole and entire and cannot be withdrawn or limited, but may only be forfeited by the sovereign himself through defeat in war or internal disorder brought on by such misrule that he loses control and society breaks down. If this sovereignty is placed in society as a whole, with a council or assembly chosen to rule (and with regularly appointed times and places for assembly) the result may be much the same as the Lockeian concept and the people may retain or delegate such ministerial authority as they choose while retaining sovereignty whole and entire among themselves. But this or any form of government except an absolute sovereignty is unstable so that every government tends towards monarchy. And in such monarchy, even if the sovereign has previously agreed to be bound by some restraints as to personal liberties or property rights, he could not be bound in perpetuity. For despite a ruler's apparent willin_gness to accept such limitations as the price of his throne, 28 / and former laws, customs and elapsed time to the contrary notwithstanding, he cannot prejudice his full exercise of sovereignty. 29 /
But then Hobbes proceeds to bow once more in the direction of Locke, conceding that some legislative prerogatives do after all reside in Parliament and in Commons. Indeed, he compares these with the legislative powers of the Roman Senate and Tribunes under the Emperors; though he argues that they exist only by sufferance of the monarch. At first these prerogatives came about in Rome because the sovereign power resided in the people and such of them remained as were not abrogated later by the emperors.30 / This concession at the very least renders defensible Lockels position that in England sovereignty does reside with the people, or at least that it did so at an earlier period. The existing situation thus becomes, as noted, a question of fact to be determined.
THE LOGIC OF COMMON VALUES
In all of this it is seen that when Hobbes and Locke are talking about the SaMe thing, Hobbes might modify, challenge the degree of emphasis, or accuse Locke of making his arguments more elaborate than necessary to sustain the thread of his logic. Nevertheless, by and large their discussions bear recognizable similarities. Hobbes is not beyond an ambiguous statement when confronted with a recalcitrant situation, all of which renders more difficult a consistent Hobbesian critique of Locke. Locke, for his own part, is moreover clearly speaking most of the time of some ideal form of representative democracy headed by an individual hereditary president, whom however he is compelled for semantic deficiencies to call a monarch. And he gives but brief acknowledgment to other forms of government. Hobbes is similarly preoccupied with monarchy; but with a monarch in whom resides what Hobbes prefers to call "absolute sovereignty"--though this is in fact shared with a parliament and separate judiciary, and the people retain certain ambiguously identified residual liberties and minimal property rights (which Hobbes, however, never tires of asserting the sovereign can reclaim at will--if only he can keep from losing control of Leviathan in the endeavor). For it must never be forgotten that Leviathan, whom we have all along been assuming to be immortal as a result of his sacred and inviolable nature, is after all subject to violent death. This may be brought about not only by foreign war, "but also through the ignorance and passions of men (and) it hath in it, from the very institutions, many seeds of a natural mortality, by Intestine Discord. 31 / Locke, a physician by profession, prescribed the medicine for this internal di sorder-- Consent (though it is evident that Hobbes was already convinced any cure was worse than the disease).
SURVIVAL AND THE LIBERAL ORDER
The essential bequest to our generation from both Hobbes and Locke seems to be that after all due account is taken of semantic and logical difficulties of communication in such important and hence emotional sectors of human experience as survival, personal freedom, the nature of property, and the relationship of man to the state, the fundamental unresolved problem is actually one of agreed (or disagreed) values. Whatever their choice of vocabulary, or surface differences in assessing man's true position vis-a-vis other men, both Hobbes and Locke shared, if only subconsciously, a broad spectrum of common underlying values. Confronted with concrete policy issues, their writings in one place or another bring them into recognizable proximity.
In contrast, the experience of our era seems to be that for all the semantic conformity of our "grey flannel" age, the society of mankind has been drifting apart as fundamental differences in values have emerged both among nations and between generations.
This is, of course, not a unique experience in history. The impact of Christianity upon Roman society in Southern and Western Europe, and later upon the pagan Norse society, in some ways may have been comparable to the apparent current drift from the Christian values which for so long supplanted the ancient concepts of "virtue."
Late seventeenth and eighteenth century society, represented by the apparently polar thought of Hobbes and Locke, could harbor striking differences, yet in practice retain enormous unity of purpose owing to a broadly shared underlying "noinosit or community of values and interests. Paradoxically, while Europe shares a more uniform culture, manner of dress, technology, and approach to government than perhaps at any time in its history, and while the international vocabulary in both military and economic affairs is more standardized than ever before, the "non-semantic gap,11 i.e., differences in value systems and value priorities among regions and age groups, may be greater than generally recognized simply because of the human tendency to take things at face value.
A second civil war did not take place in England despite the stresses of the industrial revolution and despite the apparently polar view of the defenders, in part, it is argued, because of the strongly shared field of values evolving from emergent nationalism and the Protestant reformation.
Semantic conformity will hardly serve to hold together Western society in the absence of shared and compellingly held common values. Hobbes and Locke differed less than their language suggests. We perhaps differ more from each other than our language suggests. In rejecting both the demands of strict grammar and traditional concepts of modesty, we seem as a society to have rejected the last vestige of shame and effort to avoid hypocrisy. Recognition of this, reinforced by the recent events in Iran (and the recent 1998 UK Law Lords decision re former Chilean President Pinochet, not to mention the behavior of US President Bill Clinton), should drive home the fallacy of those obsessed by prevailing wisdom that the spread of commonly held values is gradually cementing together world society.
The fact, however, remains that the issues examined with such care and insight by Hobbes and Locke are of universal application. It is, of course, easier for Leviathan to rule, once power comes into his hands, should substantial social consensus exist. But if it does not, so be it; Leviathan has ruled dissenting minorities for much of history. And in this post-atomic age, the chances of a successful farmers' revolution in any major state, even to modify--let alone displace-Leviathan, is unthinkable as has been demonstrated on several recent occasions. Hobbes and Locke still have a great deal to teach us; and their common agreement on so many issues where their initial positions appear distinct, causes one to hope that with all the shifts in our value structure, those urging society to even more rapid abandonment of old values and tried institutions will not lose sight of those irreducible elements of constraint which keep Leviathan within bounds.
NOTES
1. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc.,1956), p. 629.
2. Thomas Hobbes, De Cive or The Citizen (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Incorporated, 1949), p. 29.
3. See, for example, M. M. Goldsmith, Hobbes' Science of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 88; David P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 108, and George H. Sabine, "Thomas Hobbes,"in A History of Political Theory, New York: Henry Holt and Company,1959), pp. 461-73.
4. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 288.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 391.
7. John Locke, Treatise of Civil Government and a Letter Con cerning Toleration (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Incorporated, 1937), p. 58.
8. Ibid., pp. 14-15 *
- Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan,
p. 108.
1l. Ibid p.13
12. Ibid. P. 121
13 Locke, Treatise on Civil Government, p. 147
14 Hobbes, Leviathan , p. 122
15. Ibid , p. 287
16. Locke, op. cit . Pp. 150 ff.
17. Hobbes, Leviathan , p. 149
18. Ibid . P. 137
19. Ibid. P. 138
20. Locke, Treatise on Civil Government, p. 61
21. Ibid. Pp. 148, 154-55
22. Hobbes, Leviathan , p.126
23. Ibid . P.258
24. Ibid. P. 210
25. Ibid. pp. 161-62
26. Locke, Treatise on Civil Government, p. 120
27. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 255
28. Ibid, p. 276
29. Ibid, p. 277
30. Ibid. P. 242
31. Ibid. P. 187
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