PERSPECTIVE ON POST-MAASTRICHT POLITICAL PROGRESS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Retrospective A short few years go we celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the initiation of the Marshall Plan. It was the Marshall Plan, implemented through the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and Development, the OEEC (the predecessor of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the OECD), that accomplished the near-miraculous post-war recovery of Europe. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European neighbors were invited to participate in the Marshall Plan, but the USSR, for political reasons, determined not to do so, nor to permit it sector of Germany, nor Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, nor Bulgaria to do so. There had been events affecting the future of Europe which were in process even before the war. As Europe plunged into the depths of the Second World War, Winston Churchill, in a desperate effort to bridge the ancient antipathies to European cooperation, won the signatures of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to create a politico-military Western European Union (WEU) in the last days before the fall of France. The effort was too late to halt Hitler; and in the ashes of the early post-war period the focus was on reconstruction. But WEU continues to exist, with offices in Paris, and continues to place a limited role in the unification of Europe. In an attempt to develop a military counterpart of the WEU in the aftermath of the war, France, Germany, Benelux, and Italy attempted to form a European Defense Community. But problems of Command and language at that time proved insuperable. Jean Monet and Robert Schuman and their Europeanist colleagues, seeking to resolve the problem indirectly, adopted the so-called "pocket book" approach ("wheresoever is your treasure, there shall your heart be also".) In May, 1950 they came up with the concept of forming a special purpose European Coal and Steel Community, constituting a common market between Benelux, Germany, and France for coal and steel production in the Ruhr and Saar valleys. Within a few years, building on the astonishing success of the ECSC, six European nations banded together in what was to become the European Economic Community. The optimistic long-term objective of the EEC, calculated on the experience of the German Zollverein of a hundred years earlier (which precipitated the Deutchreich from the many separate mini-states of Germany), was to achieve by economic means the union which the militaristic conquest approach of Napoleon and Hitler, and the later peaceful, if still politically straightforward WEU and EDC had been unable to accomplish. As the Soviet threat became ever more menacing, the United States took the lead in 1949 in creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), followed shortly by the abortive Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) for the Middle East, and the Australia, New Zealand, U.S. Treaty Organization (ANZUS) for the South Pacific. A last ditch effort to salvage something from the EDC initiative was orchestrated by U.S. Ambassador Thomas Finletter -- an attempt to create a small multi-national naval force, manned by personnel from France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux nations, all serving together under unified command. U.S. support for the force was withdrawn overnight and without notice in the early days of the Kennedy Administration. Finletter, disappointed and feeling betrayed, resigned as US Ambassador to NATO. Confronted with such apparent lack of US commitment, Charles DeGaulle, then President of France, perhaps reflecting on earlier fruitless attempt to participate in Anglo-American defense planning during the war, withdrew French forces from the NATO unified command structure, committing France to an independent Force de Frappe. The remaining seven West European allies, unwilling to obligate themselves to the presumed derogation of sovereign independence associated with being a member of the European Economic Community, went their own way, forming the competing European Free Trade Area (EFTA). The British public policy group Political and Economic Planning (PEP), at that time published an interesting analytical pamphlet called, appropriately, Europe at Sixes and Sevens. At this point, matters looked more than a little gloomy for the prospects of European unification, soon, or ever. A Contemporary Focus With the passage of time, things have looked up. As everyone knows, the EEC became an enormous success. So much so that it began weaning members away from EFTA -- which had itself experienced no little success. Britain, Ireland, Norway, and more recently Portugal left EFTA for the EEC pasture. Only a rump of EFTA remains (Note as of June 1995: even Sweden and Austria -- which had remained out of the EEC on grounds of traditional neutrality, joined the EC following the fall of the Soviet Union). Even Denmark and Switzerland are reconsidering their positions. Reinforcing its claim to be the institution of European unity, the EEC has recently insisted that it be more appropriately referred to -- initially as the European Communities (reflecting its incorporation of the ECSC, EURATOM, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), but latterly simply as the European Community (EC) -- giving added emphasis to its extra-economic role in Europe. The European Parliament is now elected by popular national elections and has assumed control over the Community budget. Member governments have now grated the EC Council of Ministers authority to decide affairs by majority vote, with the exception of cases declared in advance by governments to have been reserved as matters of exceptional national importance. The European Court has felt confident in deciding a number of cases of importance to individuals and businesses by strict interpretation of the Rome Treaty, contrary even to the views of some member governments. And in 1988 the Council of Ministers announced year-end 1992 as the target for full customs union, i.e. the free movement of all goods, services, and manpower within the EC region, as envisioned when the EEC was first established almost thirty years earlier. (While in strict terms, this goal was not met, matters were close enough to target to constitute a moral victory). Almost at the same time, Britain and France entered into an agreement under which British and French forces will participate in joint exercises for the movement of British men and materiel to the Western Front through French ports, roads, and airstrips -- thus overcoming the major disadvantage of DeGaulle's withdrawal from active NATO participation twenty-five years ago. Most recently, NATO members Greece and Turkey, hereditary enemies for almost two millennia, have announced a detente based on the experience of getting along together as co-members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and of NATO for almost half a century. Indeed,viewed in broad perspective, with the exception of Europe's being unable to form a coherent policy with regard to the breakdown of civil government in Bosnia and Herzogovina, never within the purview of the EC in any event, things are looking notably positive in terms of European cooperation and interdependence. Starting with the accession to power of Deng Xiao Ping in China and Mikael Gorbachev in the USSR, reforms were set in motion which culminated in the blood bath of Tianenmin Square in Beijing, and, during the final months of 1989, in the entirely unforeseen and history-altering liberalizations in Eastern Europe. A Post-Perestroika Look Forward In the fortieth year of the New Europe, much was made, particularly in the American press, regarding the disappointing progress of the EC towards the long-term objective of unifying Europe politically. This may have been because Europe has been inordinately successful on pocketbook issues, and American journalists, looking at the state of the US trade balance, are wondering if the cost has not been too high in view of the few apparent gains in European political and military strength. On top of these questions, the events in Eastern Europe raised new questions of the first magnitude with respect to how the former Communist Bloc nations might participate in the economic progress of Western Europe. Leaders began pondering how these events -- and above all the question of German reunification -- might affect the EC's competitive posture with regard to the United States. Contrary to the conventional view propagated by the American press, military and political gains, in what for convenience's sake can be thought of as the EC Twelve, have in fact been considerable. But there has been little understanding of this because Europe has been breaking new ground, and journalists have little in the way of historical precedent against which to measure this progress. And because the Twelve are not coterminous with the NATO Fifteen, and do not include a few "maverick" countries such as Switzerland, which one way or another participate either in Europe's economic or defense arrangements, the view is misted regarding just what is going on in Europe. First and foremost, interest is high about new forms of military cooperation. German Chancellor Kohl, observing growing American unhappiness with maintaining troops in Europe fifty years after victory, and taking into account the possible effects on European security of US-Soviet disarmament initiatives, proposed a new look at a Franco-German Defense Treaty. With Spanish membership in both NATO and the EC having now been achieved, and Spain again a member in good standing of Europe -- and taking account of growing Spanish unhappiness with the presence of US forces in the peninsula, it is not improbable that Spain might take part in such arrangements. We may thus be observing the rebirth of the EDC initiative. Second, considerable progress has been made, as noted above, in asserting the role of the Council of Ministers as the effective coordinating body for day-to-day commercial, economic, financial, and political policy coordination for the EC -- though, admittedly, to a still distinctly limited degree. The European Court has made at least as much progress in asserting its right to judge personal and human rights as had the US Supreme Court in its first fifty years ( consider the Dred Scott decision almost seventy-five years after the birth of the US). Substantial progress has also been made within the Ec in terms of parliamentary elections and budget approval. There is substantial freedom of movement of both workers and professionals within the EC: neither passports nor car documents are required of the nationals of most member states. Virtually all trade and commercial matters are managed in common by Community Authorities. There is considerable commonality in educational credentials and transferability of credits. The European highway system is at least as well-evolved as that of the United States. The German system of autobahnen was indeed the model for the US Interstate Highway system, while the Eurail system outdistances anything in the US both in speed of travel and quality and convenience of service. Virtually the only factor lacking in the way of functional regional government is a joint defense system -- and while this has been delegated to NATO, it has been noted that the new Franco-German defense arrangements may shortly fill this lacuna. While a good case can thus be made that Europe is further along the road to political unification than most observers think, the evolution of the European system of government is taking unprecedented form and has thus not been appropriately identified or discussed. As we observe the ECs reaction to the evolution of post-Soviet Union events in Eastern Europe we will be in a better position to form more considered judgments regarding the wisdom and maturity of the EC. And if the EC measures up to its new challenges, those who have been lamenting the lack of progress towards the goals for which the US agreed to pay the price in terms of some trade discrimination, may have cause to revise their views. We have so far gotten what we paid for. Indeed, it may yet in time prove that we purchased an "u ugly duckling" with the future of becoming a swan, rather than a merely utilitarian Christmas goose. Third, Europe seems to be discovering its own, unprecedented road towards a "union of nations" -- more akin perhaps to the federation of sovereign states with strictly delegated powers given to the central government, as designed by America's Founding Fathers, than the more traditional central government which emerged from the Civil War, Reconstruction, the New Deal, and active Supreme Court reinterpretation of the Constitution. DEGaulle insisted that France would participate only in such a Union des Patries , and his successors of both liberal and conservative persuasion appear to support this view -- as do the Germans and, above all, the Brits. US State Legislatures used to meet for thirty days or so once a year to pass a budget bill and half a dozen new laws considered of importance. The national Congress met during the six cool months of the year, quickly adjourning when the humid summer came on. Airconditioning and the erosion of state power in favor of central government has changed all that. Today Congress has a hard time adjourning in time for its members to campaign for the next election, or to pass a budget without a six month's continuing resolution. Members of the WEU meet only every few years, when matters of overriding importance arise for consideration. And the European Parliament in Strasbourg also meets only briefly, essentially for the purposes of approving a Community budget. A Note on the Concept of a Common European Currency The reader may ask about the apparent breakdown of post-Maastricht progress towards a common European currency. Britain insisted on opting out of an agreement on a single currency. And Germany, home of perhaps the best managed currency system in the world, has also expressed concern. In fact, the reluctance to abandon the Mark, the Fran, and the Pound Sterling in favor of the Ecu (or Euromark, or whatever) may prove the highest wisdom. Almost thirty years ago the Canadian economist Harry Mundell published an article in the American Economic Journal called The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas in which it was argued that in an extended trading area like the United States, there exist natural sub-regions which would benefit from having a local currency: that the attempt to impose a single medium of exchange for New England, the Mid-Atlantic States, the Deep South, the Mid-West, the Rocky Mountain region, the Soutwest, the Northwest, and the Pacific Coast, meant that when the Fed tightens money to restrain inflation in one region, it would necessarily mean deepening recessionary forces in another. And that it would be to the advantage of such large nations to accept the marginal inconvenience accompanying the need for currency exchange in return for the ability to manipulate monetary policy to restrain inflation or reduce unemployment as required. While it may indeed prove desirable for certain members of the EC to peg their currencies to the Mark (or Franc, or Pound), it is likely that should a single currency ever be adopted in this enormously rich, diverse, and extended European economic area (particularly as Eastern Europe begins to associate with the present EC fourteen), that Mundell's wisdom will soon be rediscovered and that the imposition of a single monetary policy across the board will leave some member countries dragged into the recession of a more powerful trading partner, or being subject to and inflationary policy imposed by EC Central Bank authorities attempting to solve an unemployment problem in another corner of the region. In any case, pressures will soon mount to return to the present system of national currencies, even at the price of resuming the transaction cost of currency exchanges. A New Polity - The New Diplomacy It is quite possible that the European way will prove as adequate as, if not superior to the American system, which was after all given form before the evolution of modern parliamentary democracy. Indeed, with careful thought and the type of courageous global perspective which characterized American post-war planning, the type of looser European confederation which is taking form may provide just the opportunity needed to reintegrate the former Bloc countries in their post-perestroika form into the European Community, from which they have been alienated for fifty years. And, with precaution, without instilling such inordinate fear in the Russians, to precipitate a western Tianenmin Square. Some years ago Fred Ikle wrote a seminal article in which he argued that with modern communications and transportation we are experiencing a profound transformation in the practice of diplomacy. Historically, diplomatic missions, most often led by a member of the Royal Family to ensure loyalty, were sent to transact business or negotiate treaties on an ad hoc basis. It was the Italian City States of the Renaissance, constantly at way with one another, who devised the current system of permanent missions led by experienced, professional diplomats. The intention was to maintain close contact with the foreign government, gaining the ear of the sovereign as a permanent member of his court, and keeping an eye open for machinations which could affect the interests of the home state. The Italian system has worked remarkably well for a remarkably long time. But nothing demands that it be permanent -- or the only system which works. This suggests that professional diplomats are today, with rare exceptions, at best marionettes attempting to represent the home government at second hand, and with limited access to policy makers. Matters have become somewhat better with telegraph and telephone, and the possibility of flying home for "consultations" regarding the most important matters. But Ikle suggests it is now equally possible for Ministers and their immediate subordinates, armed with first hand knowledge of the policies and intentions of governments to fly at short notice to discuss, or negotiate matters with their counterparts abroad -- or to participate in meetings of an international organization or conference. Ikle further suggests that in future, diplomats will be no more than door holder, appointment makers, and hotel reservation arrangers for those arriving from home base to transact a nations affairs at first hand. As one who was involved in diplomacy for nearly forty years, the author can attest that this is in fact fast happening. A majority of US ambassadors are no longer professionals. An ambassadorship has become an appropriate reward for a political loyalist. At major embassies, e.g. Paris, London, Tokyo, or Rome, half a dozen senior government officials arrive each week to transact business, and a major function of the ambassador's office is indeed to make appointments and hotel reservations. While the ambassador is still in theory the President's alter ego and personal representative to the head of state of the country to which he is accredited. And, as such, nominally senior to any other American official in that country other than the President himself. But who is going to tell the Secretary of the Treasury or Secretary of Defense that the ambassador must accompany him on his visits to senior officials to make a clear record of what transpired (a sine qua non of traditional diplomacy). I have witnessed some stressful scenes when an Ambassador or his Counselor were told that their presence "was not desired" at a particular meeting. During the tenure of the late Walter Heller as Chairman of the Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisors, the Ikle system worked to perfection. Heller (and later his successor Gardner Ackley) used to fly to Paris meetings of the OECD Economic Policy Committee with first hand knowledge of the policy intentions of the White House, influentially exchanging information with their equally knowledgeable counterparts. And the International EconomicPolicy Coordination Instrument was as a result powerfully successful in extending the longest period of uninterrupted expansion to that point in US history. During the Carter Administration, on the other hand, as a result of his administration's disinterest in foreign affairs, matters returned to the hands of traditional diplomats, the coordination of international economic policy broke down and we experienced the deepest recession since the 1930s. Perhaps the strongest argument for the Ikle position is the growth of Summitry, in which Heads of State have taken to meeting with each other in historically unprecedented manner to resolve high matters of state. (Though as has been observed on the twentieth anniversary of the G-7 meetings, even summits can have their ups and downs, Halifax representing a distinct down, with the US/Japan trade dispute having received no resolution at all). Within the EC such meetings of Heads of State are common and quite regular. While the pro-forma results (or non-results) of the annual Economic Summits instituted by former French President Valery Giscard d'Estang have been pooh-poohed by the American press, there is no doubt that in the interests of "no surprise" economic and defense initiatives in our increasingly interactive world, it has been a major international plus for the EC leaders to get together frequently to exchange views, assess each others' personalities, and obtain feedback regarding potential policy shifts. The importance of such meetings in a world where they are now possible (witness the frequent meetings of top business and religious leaders) is underlined by the fact that such a fundamental conservative as Ronald Reagan made time for three such meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, the chief military and political competitor of the United States. An additional example of the drift towards post-Classical diplomacy is the "shuttle diplomacy" of Foreign Ministers instituted by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and continued by his successor George Schultz as a means for Foreign Ministers to negotiate solutions to major international problems personally, rather than through professional subordinates. (Critics have noted that in the case of both summitry and shuttle diplomacy a government loses something almost as important as what is gained through directness, that is the possibility of referring a tentative agreement back to higher authority for review and revision. Any professional diplomat who has engaged in treaty negotiation realized what an important factor this can be in assuring precision and in allowing a final try before signature on an agreement. The controversial disarmament position taken by President Reagan at the Reykjavik Summit, and the subsequent open opposition to his position expressed by retiring NATO and SACEUR Commander Rogers is a good example of the difficult a nation and a Head of State can experience when they take over direct negotiation of complex and highly sensitive affairs. So Europe is Further Along the Road to Political Unity Than is Commonly Thought It is not uncommon for practice to precede theory. Indeed, theory often emerges only some time later to explain definitively what practitioners have long known. It is thus the burden of this paper to argue is further ahead in evolving a new form of regional government than most have credited it with. Ministers from home governments fly to Brussels every few weeks. Parliamentarians similarly live at home, flying to Strasbourg only for the relatively brief periods parliament is in session (not too different from American Congressmen who are fortunate enough to live close enough to the nation's capital to get away with doing this). Why should a form of political association which emerged at the beginning of the modern era determine that always and forever a standing Cabinet of plenipotentiary Ministers of State be the only body authorized to conduct the business of a government, regional or otherwise. Why shouldn't Finance Ministers of the constituent states convene as necessary to transact Community business, leaving an instructed commission behind to implement policy, as decided upon -- rather like the Civil Service Permanent Under Secretaries in British government, who administer the day-to-day functions of the Ministries, but always under direction of a political Minister. Perhaps we've seen emerge a new form of pluralistic government as different from traditional Parliamentary (or Presidential) democracy, as were Sixteenth Century Nation States from Renaissance City States, or from the Roman Empire -- which in turn emerged from the earlier Roman Republic, each uniquely suited to the time and historical circumstances of its era.