RENATO: THOUGHTS ON POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN DEFENSE Background The post-WW II world evolved neither as neatly nor as simply as the drafters of the United Nations Treaty hoped. The new UNO was intended, through the Security Council, to provide for world defense against aggression; through the IMF for international monetary cooperation; through the IBRD, reconstruction assistance to prostrate Europe and development aid to the underdeveloped nations of the world; and through the ITO to restored fair and free trade. The Cold War put finis to the brave dream of Security Council cooperation. When the first big trouble subsequent to the fall of Czechoslovakia's free government broke out, as North Korea invaded the South, nothing more could have been done than in Eastern Europe had the Soviet Union not, in a fit of pique, made the mistake of walking out on the debate of the Security Council, leaving the United States to put together the coalition which sent an expeditionary force (most comprised of U.S. troops) to Korea to salvage the situation. Similarly, the U.S.S.R. chose not to participate in the IMF or IBRD. And the desperate condition of Europe left no time for either UN agency to do much to remedy the situation. The Marshall Plan, totally underwritten by the U.S., stepped into the breach, and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was created to serve as the operating agency for the Marshall Plan. The post-war situation also made it impossible for the International Trade Organization (ITO) to get off the ground: Britain and France, hoping to hold on to their pre-war imperial dependencies and to preserve their preferential trade relationships with them, failed to ratify the ITO, and only the makeshift General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the now familiar GATT), was salvaged -- though GATT has since outperformed all hopes or expectations. Indeed, following the last minute success of GATT's Uruguay round of tariff reductions in late 1993, there seems to be sufficient sentiment to set up a continuing review body to turn the GATT into a World Trade Organization (WTO) approaching the ITO as initially envisioned. On the defense side, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was hastily structured to counter Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe. Holding the fort over forty years against what later became the rival Warsaw Pact, NATO has been left triumphant in the field as the Berlin Wall fell, the Warsaw Pact was dismantled, and Eastern Europe has returned to shaky democracy and nascent free markets. The Soviet Union itself has been left in such shambles that for a time no one even knew what to call what was left of it. Of Umbrellas and Newspapers Over One's Head The great post-war concept of a world-wide umbrella organization, with a dozen sub-units to take care of everything from defense, to trade, to monetary policy, to development aid, to world health and child care has been succeeded by more a more realistic approach. As Richard Gardner wrote in his seminal work, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy , the three great errors of post-war planning were "economism" (the belief that an understanding of pure economic theory was sufficient to overcome historic inertia and national self-interest); "legalism" (the belief that reducing half-hearted promises to a signed piece of paper was sufficient to outweigh changing attitudes of successor governments and the activation of escape clauses whenever minor problems arise); and "universalism" (the unrealistic notion that a single world organization could deal with all problems of whatever scale or geographic diversity). Fortunately, the U.S. and its major Western Partners learned from the near-disastrous post-WW II experiences. Despairing of solving the world's problems at one fell swoop, the Free World began giving attention to problems on a region by region, task-by-task basis. Instead of trying to create a single umbrella organization to solve all regional problems, they turned to piecemeal, often ad hoc , and sometimes intentionally temporary, measures to address specific problems: NATO for Western defense; the OEEC to put Europe together again; GATT to help post-war Europe start its protracted move towards more liberal trade, with the intention of keeping trade protectionism from becoming a permanent burden on world development it had become during the Great Depression; and, finally, the unilateral agency USAID to address the problems of those parts of the developing world which could be induced to tilt in favor of free trade and democracy as opposed to Marxism (though lots of heavy compromising has occurred over the intervening years). Such ad hoc- ism might be called the "newspaper over the head" approach; i.e., every man (or region) providing what cover possible for oneself when the rains come instead of all sheltering together under a substantial tent or beach umbrella. Attacking problems in bite-sized chunks has worked. Both GATT and NATO, at least, have, as noted, exceeded all hopes and expectations. The OEEC (now the OECD) was a resounding triumph. And the IMF and IBRD have not been without their successes. To be sure there remain problems. Japan has introduced into the system a new and unforeseen form of neo-protectionism: a monopsonistic, nation-wide purchasing and distribution system which has proved a formidable (and non-GATTable) alternative to old-fashioned tariffs and quotas. Europe has formed a new trade bloc which is proving even more aggressive and powerful than anticipated -- and while enormously trade-creating, also more trade-diverting than the old-fashioned systems of imperial preferences, or than its competitors find comfortable. But there are positive elements far outweighing these unresolved problems. GATT has enabled world trade to grow at a pace and to an extent undreamed of by post-war planners. USAID, because of its considerable success, stimulated any number of other nations to emulate (sometimes more successfully) its efforts. As a result, the U.S. today finds itself far down, indeed near the bottom of the list of aid donors, ranked as percentage of development aid to GDP. Several UN subsidiaries have also achieved notable success: UNICEF has performed valiant work among the world's deprived children. WHO has performed notably in immunization and mother-child health efforts. The IBRD, while slow off the mark, has through its several soft-loan windows, in recent times provided valuable development aid to many nations. And the IMF, while initially also a reluctant player, has now attracted post-Soviet Russia to apply for belated membership. Even traditionally neutral Switzerland has been edging towards participation -- recently holding a plebiscite on the possibility of joining. And the UN's Blue Berets have, despite recent problems in Somalia and the Balkans, become essential elements in separating combatants in a number of regional hostilities, e.g. Lebanon and the Persian Gulf. One hopes that they may become even more successful in avoiding, or limiting, hostilities as the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. learn to work together more closely and the UN Security Council, after forty-five years of stultification, begins to assume more the role for which it was intended. A Potential Precedent The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established in 1947 for the express purpose of enabling those European nations which had shown interest in receiving US reconstruction assistance to develop their own plans and priorities and to decide upon an equitable repartition of US aid. In the process, the OEEC put together a Secretariat of unprecedented quality, established a series of committees and a schedule for national Ministers of Finance, Trade, and Economics to meet together on a regular basis to exchange plans, intentions, and experiences, based on the most up-to-date, comprehensive, comparable, and reliable economic statistics ever known in the history of the world. (The UN regional economic groupings which were intended to do such work, in the case of Europe the Economic Commission for Europe [ECE], have, as a result of the Cold War, never acquired equivalently competent secretariats or generated timely submissions of economic data. Even today UN statistics are incomplete, not fully comparable, and always two to three years old before they first appear in print. Europe was back on its feet and the work of the OEEC essentially accomplished by 1957. Question then arose whether or not to fold its tent. Many had become so impressed by the performance of its able secretariat in providing fully comparable and comprehensive economic statistics on a quarterly basis, as well as by its service as a forum for exchange of ideas and intentions by the world's top financial and economic leadership, that it was decided to preserve the Secretariat and enlarge the organization by adding the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to its membership. Japan joined sometime later. The renamed Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) dropped "Europe" from its title and added "Development" coordination to its tasks. I have written elsewhere about my ideas regarding how regional versions of the OECD (Marks II and III -- and, possibly, IV) could usefully be created to accommodate the Latin American countries, the Middle East -- and now, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union -- as it has served as a model for the countries of Southeast Asian (ASEAN). (As a side observation, recently admitted Mexico does not really comfortably fit into the existing OECD. It would better have constituted a strong cornerstone for a filial Western Hemisphere organization). This is not as bizarre a notion as some may think. The OECD itself is, strictly speaking, neither regional (including as it does Australia, New Zealand, and Japan), nor uniformly rich (Portugal and Turkey are members), nor ideologically purely free market (Yugoslavia was a charter member). Such OECD-clones might also accept as members non-regional nations with strong interests in the focus area. One would assume that the US would wish to be at least an Associate Member of each such new grouping, and that the Russia would wish to associate itself with the East European, Asian, and, perhaps, Middle Eastern clones. Indeed, this might provide a better solution than the fretful imperative now being considered by some CIS countries to reassociate themselves economically with Russia. Before moving on, note should be given to the interesting fact that after twenty-five years of sitting across the table from each other in OECD meetings (about the only place they continued to talk to each other), Greece and Turkey four years ago eventually found sufficient common ground to start bilateral talks to resolve their political and military differences, crediting their favorable OECD experience for this possibility. One wonders whether Israel and the Confrontation States might not have found it easier to start talking in Madrid had they had a few years of preceding experience as common members of a Near East OECD-Mark II (or III). Whither NATO With the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact all sorts of speculation has grown up regarding the future of NATO. Some US Congressmen have been licking their lips over potential new domestic social welfare programs, counting on money saved from the NATO budget to finance them. Some West European leaders, anticipating U.S. withdrawal from Europe, have been talking about various forms of European defense cooperation, including an already nascent Franco-German joint brigade. Until the world knows a good deal more about the future of the Russia, however, including its relationships with Kazahkstan, Azerbaijan, the Ukraine and Byelorussia; and the chemistry at work in post-reunification Germany following the restoration of its capital to Berlin, such chicken counting is premature. Looking at another region of the world, many are becoming concerned following the fiftieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor, about Japan's re-emergence as a world military power. Under the post-war Japanese Constitution essentially dictated by General McArthur, Japan is limited to a so-called "Self Defense Force". Nevertheless, with a 1991 defense budget of $32 billion, it's Self Defense Force constitutes the third largest defense outlay in the world, having doubled since 1976. Japan's navy, one of the largest in the world, is already formidable. And the decision to amend the constitution to permit the Japanese army to participate in joint military ventures abroad is raising shadows in the minds of many who have not forgotten the past. Indeed, taking a realistic look at the world and at history, a redesigned NATO, or something very much like NATO will continue to be essential in the interests of world stability. The NATO Council & the NATO Command Structure - Another Precedent? This is not to say that NATO's great success, like that of the OEEC's, might not be redirected to other, if related, goals. While the Clinton Administration has (some think unwisely) decided to appease Russia by denying NATO membership to the several former-Bloc countries which have expressed a desire for such in favor of a rather formless, so-called Friendship relationship, might the operational scope of NATO not yet eventually (and one hopes without sufficient delay to give Russian militarists time and incentive to regroup an all-but-in-name Soviet bloc), be recast somewhat as was the OEEC's, by broadening its broadening its membership and adding a new task or two? NATO consists of two distinct bodies: the NATO Council, where issues of common defense strategy are determined; and the NATO Defense Command which devises and practices tactics to implement this strategy -- and from which France chose to withdraw in 1965 when President DeGaulle's proposal for an inner caucus comprised of the U.S., France, and Great Britain foundered. If NATO's role were expanded to include world-wide defense of member country concerns, instead of being limited to Continental Europe, but with the distinction between the NATO Council and the NATO Command Structure maintained, might it not provide just the collegial restraint for the Russian (and Japanese) military for which the world is searching? If invited to join NATO, like post-Franco Spain, any newly admitted former-Bloc countries and Japan should understand that they would not be admitted to the Defense Command structure at an early date. But if Gaullist and post-Gaullist France has been able to participate in NATO Council discussions for twenty-five years while independently pursuing its unilateral Tout Azimut defense strategy outside the NATO Command structure, it is hard to see why the USSR (and the rest of Eastern Europe) could not be invited to participate as Associate Members of the NATO Council. This would constitute the all-time greatest "confidence building" measure conceivable, while leaving the NATO Command structure and defense strategy uncompromised and unimpaired. Since my own association with NATO twenty-five years ago as Executive to the U.S. Ambassador, great stress has been laid on NATO's political role as parallel to and not subordinate to its defense role. As the EC has evolved, it has moved increasingly into the political realm, becoming in the process much more than a mere Common Market (just as intended by Jean Monet, who saw that if European political union could not be achieved in a straightforward manner, perhaps it could be advanced through pocketbook issues). In the process, the role of NATO as a political organization has waned -- at least in the minds of most Europeans. Not so for the United States, since NATO remains its only political connection, outside the UN, with the nations of Europe. Reverting to the earlier simile of "newspapers over the head" as contrasted with beach umbrellas, it can be argued that a relatively quiescent US (and Soviet) role in NATO might at this point be just what the doctor ordered. It might indeed be time for the first non-US EUCOM (European Commander of NATO forces). No one wishes to impede Europe's movement towards economic, social, monetary (and eventually?) political union. And America's voluntarily assuming a back seat in NATO at this time, while retaining its membership and maintaining a somewhat reduced force level in Europe, might avert rising antipathies in Germany, such as those which caused DeGaulle to request the removal of US forces in France a quarter of a century ago. Europeans themselves have found it useful to activate one or another of the "newspaper-over-the-head" organizations founded throughout the years for one specific need or another. The Western European Union (founded in the last days before the fall of France as Winston Churchill's desperate attempt to unite what remained of Free Europe against Hitler) holds infrequent meetings (but has a stand-by secretariat in Paris to give the organization form and substance). WEU has served several minor, but useful purposes over the years. I have written elsewhere that I believe Europe is evolving towards a form of union -- more than confederation but less than historically-understood federation -- of a form never before experienced in the world. This is being made possible by such new modalities as rapid air transport, and instantaneous telephone and FAX connections. With the experience gained through multi-national Secretariats and non-political Secretaries General in the UN and various other international organizations, it is now be possible for the legislative function presently carried out by the resident EC Council of Ministers to be accomplished by Minister-delegates who are fully-informed and instructed members of national Cabinets, flying to Brussels for weekly meetings instead of being handled on a residential basis -- historically by ambassadors, or elected or appointed senators or representatives. Nor, does it appear, that veto power need always and forever be understood as an Executive prerogative. This view has been recently vindicated as the European Parliament, which served little effective purpose for many years, has been given veto power over Community proposals. Whatever shape post-Cold War Europe takes, a close defense relationship between it and the United States (and Russia?) should and must be maintained if we are to avoid the prospect of one region or another taking a divergent road in the medium to longer range future. History has held altogether too many surprises for one to assume otherwise. While the United States will inevitably continue to maintain an independent military force (as probably will France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, Russian and the other European and world Powers), the intention of the nations behind these forces can best be harmonized through attachment to a successful NATO nexus. In Summary It may seem weak beer to envision such an apparently insignificant active role as outlined above for an enlarged NATO Council. But not when one looks more closely at what such a NATO could accomplish. If NATO continues to rotate senior officers through the unified command structure (initially excluding Soviet and Japanese officers), bringing the senior ranks of professional soldiers into close proximity with their counterparts in the Alliance for a period of years during their progression towards senior command; and if NATO continues its annual program of Field Exercises -- presumably extended to joint naval maneuvers in the Pacific and Indian Oceans -- contacts will be developed and maintained among national officers at every level. The preparation of joint plans would focus the attention of national leadership on the strength and agreed intentions of the Alliance, reducing fears about the independent intentions of neighbors, and limiting the ability, if not the incentives, for independent military action on the part of radical leadership among NATO member nations. And, while this for a time must remain a dream for the future, it might also enable NATO to take on a joint role as world peace-keeper in the event of another Korea, Vietnam, or Persian Gulf crisis -- just what Japan is now discussing for its own Defense Force. The UN is clearly not ready for such a role, as amply demonstrated by the situation in Bosnia-Herzogovina. Nor with its many squabbling, radical small member states is it clear that the larger, stable Powers would yet wish the UN to possess such an independent force directly responsible to either the Security Council or the General Assembly. Senator Dole's recent comments on this matter are strong evidence that not all in the U.S. either would be prepared for such an expanded UN role. What better way then can be suggested to respond to Russia's currently expressed desire for acceptance by the rest of the world, and Japan's (and Germany's) new interest in extending its military reach abroad, than to have on tap a force representing a broad international spectrum of democratic nations, with the experience of annual joint maneuvers (and representing all but China among the Security Council's Permanent Members) to assume any task authorized by the Security Council -- itself reflecting the political will of all major members of an expanded NATO. A Not-Afterthought on Japan The suggestion has been made above, and not so much as an afterthought but as part and parcel of this proposal, for a reconstituted NATO with an enlarged role in world peace, that Japan be included in re-thinking NATO. This is particularly important at a time when Japan is flexing its economic muscle and approving participation by its National Defense Force in action abroad. If NATO is opened to Russia, it might prove politically disastrous not to invite Japan to join a reconstituted NATO. Indeed, if Japan and the USSR were to join at the same time, it would make such restructuring easier, and bring Japan's new Military, which has the potential of becoming, in a not too distant future, as great a threat to regional or world peace as Japanese industry has become to trade, under the effective control of Europe and the United States. NOGAP or RENATO? As with the restructuring of the OEEC into the OECD -- adding the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to its membership and the job of Development Aid Coordination to its terms of reference and restyled title -- the name of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would have to be changed to reflect its new membership, new geographic orientation, and new role. Perhaps something like The Northern Great Atlantic-Pacific Treaty Organization (NOGAP) would be appropriate -- memorializing the fall of the Wall and reflecting the removal of this great gap in relation between East and West. Alternatively, the new incarnation could be called RENATO, Restructured (or Reborn) NATO -- a symbolic expression of hope for a Reborn World.