DAVID B. TIMMINS 2416 "I" Street, NW Washington, DC 20037 March 31, 1990 General Brent Scowcroft National Security Advisor National Security Council The White House Washington, D.C. Re: Application of British Commonwealth model to resolve Lithuanian-Soviet impasse. Dear General Scowcroft: Everyone is concerned about the situation in Lithuania and the possible repercussions on other countries in Eastern Europe should Mr. Gorbachev be compelled by some inadvertent action on one side or the other to intervene militarily. I'm writing to pass on in as timely a fashion as possible an idea which came up in dinner party discussion tonight among a DuPont executive, a Marriott official (who worked at the White House during the Reagan Administration), an Eastern Michigan University professor, a couple of State Department types, and myself -- a retired FSO and former Deputy Director of the Office of Economic Analysis in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Should you find the idea attractive, I would hope you or the President could mention it to Mr. Gorbachev and the leaders of Lithuania in an early telephone conversation. The problem as we see it is that Lithuania wants total independence, while Mr. Gorbachev can preserve his support within the Politburo only by convincing them to accept, at a minimum, some form of federated political association. At the moment, both sides are groping for a solution since neither the existing system nor any alternative so far put forward seems acceptable to one party or the other. Extended negotiations over the matter threaten to exceed the time framework of the Lithuanians, threatening the occurrence of some disastrous event shortcircuiting the process. We wondered whether perhaps the British Commonwealth or post-colonial French Union models might not serve the interests of both Lithuanians and Soviets. Both post-colonial systems, while granting full sovereignty and national independence in both form and substance, preserve the possibility of continuing security, economic, financial, and trade relationships as well as continuing special political ties. The concept could conceivably be extended to other Soviet constituent republics seeking greater freedom from Moscow. Commonwealth leaders meet annually. Were such meetings of former Soviet political subdivisions to take place on a continuing basis, this would provide Mr. Gorbachev with the appearance of having preserved the substance of political unity while granting the peoples seeking independence the essence of national sovereignty. In the security sphere, Lithuania presently insists on total withdrawal of Soviet troops whereas the Soviet military demands a continued presence. A Commonwealth-type solution would envision a continued presence of Soviet troops within the embrace of a mutual defense treaty similar to the French presence in Senegal and the British presence in the Persian Gulf prior to 1971. In the economic sphere , Lithuania wants full control of all economic enterprises and foreign trade whereas Mr. Gorbachev has asked for full reimbursement for past Soviet investment and/or continuing equity rights in the Lithuanian economy. A Commonwealth-type solution would enable the Soviets to maintain some form of equity participation in the Lithuanian economy as with British and French foreign investment in the Commonwealth partners. On the political side , the Lithuanians insist on full sovereign independence, whereas Gorbachev is under political pressure to preserve the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. Under a Commonwealth solution, Mr. Gorbachev covers himself by being able to point to the Soviet Union's continuing special political relationship with Lithuania (or any other entities electing this solution) in the same way the British post-Colonial pride was preserved with regard to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other former colonies and dominions. Eric Anthony Jones, a Foreign Service Officer assigned to Shanghai, who has a PhD in Soviet and Chinese politics from the University of Michigan, taught for several years at Brigham Young University, and was working until recently as an analyst in the Office of Soviet Analysis at the CIA, suggests that perhaps the most appropriate contact in the Lithuanian government would be Prime Minister Kazimeira Prunskiene, a noted economist and innovative thinker. On the Soviet side, we think it might be most productive to approach Alexander Yakovlev, a Politburo member and confidant of Gorbachev. Sincerely, David B. Timmins, PhD, FSO (ret.)